The main event at the informal CIS summit in St Petersburg was the presence of the heads of all the partner-countries, even the president of affiliated Turkmenistan, Fedor Lukyanov, chief editor of Rossiya v Globalnoy Politike: "The Era of Profitability", commented at Russian Gazeta.ru website on 14 June.

I may be mistaken, but I think the last case of 100-per cent attendance was recorded four years ago - at another informal summit on the banks of the Neva, timed to coincide with the 300th anniversary of the northern capital.

The period between the two summits included the radical revision of the system of relations in the post-Soviet zone. Judging by some indications, Moscow started taking a new approach to its neighbours. In essence, it is cold and calculating, devoid of charity and sentiment.

The Ukrainian events of 2004 were the turning point, of course. The main lesson of that confusing time was this: Russia no longer wants to play on the domestic policy playing field of neighbouring states, finding "pro-Russian" forces there and putting its money on them.

After the change of regime in Ukraine, in which non-governmental organizations played such a substantial role, there was some talk in Russia about "gentle force," but it never went beyond words. An extremely tough approach was chosen instead: We want only income and displays of loyalty. The former augments the treasury and the latter increases the political capital determining our place in global geopolitical competition.

The move to market prices for gas and the "punishment" of anyone disloyal turned out to be quite expensive from the standpoint of Moscow’s international image and its reputation as a reliable supplier of energy resources. Judging by all indications, however, this did not bother the Kremlin that much.

As far as image was concerned, officials in the Kremlin concluded that Russia would be criticized fiercely no matter what it did. As for reputation, the prevailing opinion was that Russia’s European clients would not go elsewhere anyway.

After the oil and gas war with Belarus in December and January, Minister of Economic Development German Gref reported the completion of the ring of market-driven relations along the RF border. This created the necessary conditions for the pursuit of a new policy line. How can it be described?

First of all, Russia gave up the role of the regional power concerned only with the performance of global functions. The general expectations of reintegration around Moscow were just phantom pains.

The power to influence adjacent territories is no longer viewed as a goal in itself. It is a method of accumulating strength for perceptible progress in the world arena.

Consequently, the Kremlin’s political and economic steps in the CIS should not be viewed in the regional context.

Second, the common approach was discarded. Relations with each state will be viewed separately and in light of the benefits Russia can derive from them. The amount of effort invested will also depend on degrees of importance and benefit.

Third, profitability will be a political concept as well as an economic term from now on. The harsh treatment of Georgia, for example, might seem illogical on the surface, but it will be profitable because it will demonstrate determination and severity towards the disloyal. Others will see this and will think twice.

The Qabala radar is a recent example of an asset that suddenly became profitable when it served as the Russian trump card in the big game over the American ABM. The political and publicity impact of Vladimir Putin’s "impromptu" remarks at the G8 summit clearly surpasses the 7m dollars Moscow pays Baku in leasing fees each year.

Fourth, there will be no more discussion of equal rights in the post-Soviet zone. None of these countries (with only one exception) can hope to deal with Russia on equal terms. The only exception is Kazakhstan, which not only does not depend on Russia’s energy resources, but also turned into an important Asian power by choosing to conduct a carefully planned policy.

The fifth and final change is Russia’s unequivocal acceptance of any political regime in the partner-countries. This gives it a distinct advantage over the United States and European Union, which are confined within certain ideological boundaries despite their enviable pragmatism. These boundaries will not allow the West to embrace "Papa" Lukashenka, who wants to be free of the Russian locomotive, or to engage in oil and gas transactions with Uzbek leader Karimov. In contrast, Russia is willing to do business with anyone - an autocrat in Central Asia or a democrat in Moldova or Ukraine - as long as it pays off. If not, no amount of ostentatious anti-American behaviour will work (Minsk is a good example of this).

Russia’s treatment of its neighbours is part of its aggressive behaviour in the whole international arena. This will make an impression on the "near abroad."

Moscow will not win any new friends, of course, but no one will dare write it off as geopolitical refuse either.

Furthermore, flirtation with Russia will once again be a domestic policy instrument in the CIS countries.

Feliks Kulov, the Kyrgyzstani opposition leader, recently took an indicative step, suggesting confederation with Russia, similar to the Russian-Belarusian model. The idea had no real basis and was meant strictly for domestic consumption, but the very fact that it was voiced proves that Moscow’s capabilities are taken seriously.

Russia’s rising prestige in the eyes of its neighbours is due to its increased activity and its ability to derail Western policy. In the final analysis, the United States and the European Union cannot boast of any major successes in the post-Soviet zone other than the Caspian Baku-Ceyhan and Baku-Erzerum projects (launched when Bill Clinton was still in office) and the rise of Mikheil Saakashvili in Georgia.

Turkmenistan could not be tamed, the westward shift in policy in Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan misfired for various reasons, and it would be impossible to describe the events in Ukraine as anyone’s victory. Although the West had the advantage during the first phase of the struggle for influence, it evidently was not ready to take its new partners seriously and make any definite promises. This is particularly apparent in the case of Ukraine, which took great pains to break out of the Russian sphere of influence and ran into the locked door of the European Union.

What should Russia expect now?

Moscow feels quite confident, mounting simultaneous assaults in all sectors, from the Caspian pipeline and OSCE to Kosovo and the CFE and ABM treaties. Russia has been trying for a long time to be taken seriously in the "near" and "far" abroad. It appears that we are close to success. Now it is important not to miss the moment when this serious treatment can be converted into equally serious agreements and "generate profits."

Otherwise, after all, the players on the other side of the table could unite their efforts, and this would be the start of a genuine "zero-sum game."

Furthermore, the somewhat disdainful attitude we recently developed towards Western capabilities could turn out to be deeply mistaken. Then our neighbours, the allies we acquired with a view to their profitability, will start bargaining again with the side that looks the strongest.